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CHIMEL v. CALIFORNIA-ITS EFFECT ON
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution' allows
a limited right of search and seizure and proscribes unreasonable
searches. The question is, what constitutes an unreasonable search?
In the Supreme Court's attempts to develop a coherent body of
Fourth Amendment law there has been a constant conflict over the
importance of requiring law enforcement officers to secure warrants.
Although the tendency has been to predicate the reasonableness of a
search on the existence of a warrant, it should not be presumed that
this is always the case. There are several limited exceptions which
allow an officer to conduct a reasonable search without a warrant.'
1. The Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonble searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.
Const. Amend. IV applicable to the states through Amend. XIV. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
2. The other exceptions which allow an officer to search without a warrant are:
a. Plain View. 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); United States
v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
b. Consent to the Search. "When a householder consents to a warrantless search by the
police, he in effect waives his Constitutional rights and cannot later object to the use in
court of any incriminating evidence uncovered." J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the
Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 168 (1966).
The obtaining of a search warrant may be waived by an individual and he may give his
consent to search and seizure but such waiver or consent must be proven by clear and
positive testimony and there must be no duress or coercion, actual or implied, and the
Government must show a consent that is unequivocal and specific, freely and intelligently
given and the burden of the government is particularly heavy where the individual is under
arest. Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 at 650, 651 (1951). See also Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); State v. Aull, 78 N.M. 607, 435 P.2d 437 (1967); State v.
Herring, 77 N.M. 232, 421 P.2d 767 (1966); State v. Torres, 81 N.M. 521, 469 P.2d 166
(1970); State v. Harrison, 81 N.M. 324, 466 P.2d 890 (1970); State v. Kennedy, 80 N.M.
152, 452 P.2d 486 (1969).
c. Vehicular Searches in which the automobile is mobile and capable of being quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. For cases see
discussion of vehicular searches, infra.
d. Protection Weapons Search or Stop and Frisk search. The police are allowed to "stop"
a person and detain him briefly for questioning upon suspicion that he may be connected
with criminal activity. Upon suspicion that the person may be armed, the police have the
power to "frisk" him for weapons. If this gives rise to probable cause to believe that the
suspect has committed a crime, then the police should be empowered to make a formal
"arrest" and a full incident search of the person. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
e. Hot Pursuit. In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) it was held that when police
are in hot pursuit of a suspected criminal, that speed is essential to protect the officers and
prevent the suspect's escape and therefore a warrantless search of a house is permissable, so
long as the scope is as broad as may reasonably be necessary to prevent the danger that the
suspect at large in the house may resist or escape.
f. Danger of Destruction of the Evidence. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
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Chimel v. California3 deals with such an exception, a search incident
to a lawful arrest. Chimel is significant because it defines the permissible limits of such a search. Although the court attempted to be as
specific as possible, subsequent cases have shown that Chimel is
ambiguous in various areas. This comment will discuss a few of these
unclear areas, particularly Chimel's effect on the Plain View Doctrine
and on vehicular searches.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND OF CHIMEL

In Chimel the defendant was arrested in his home for the burglary
of a coin shop. Although the officers were armed with an arrest
warrant, they did not have a search warrant and, despite defendant's
objections, conducted a search of his entire three-bedroom house,
including the attic, garage, a small workshop, and various drawers.
The evidence found during the search was admitted at trial and
resulted in defendant's conviction on two charges of burglary. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed (7-2) holding the search to be
unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court
reasoned that without a search warrant an arresting officer, conducting a search incident to a lawful arrest, may search only the
arresting individual's person and the area within his "immediate
control" to discover and remove weapons and to seize evidence to
prevent its concealment or destruction. 4
Prior to this decision, more extensive searches incident to arrest
had been justified by the independent existence of probable cause to
search. Chimel, however, made it clear that even though probable
cause to search was independently established after the arrest, the
necessity of obtaining a search warrant remained.' The court expressly overruled United States v. Rabinowitz6 and Harris v. United
States7 which allowed a much broader scope of search incident to
(1966) the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. He claimed
that the taking or "seizure" of his blood was an unconstitutional search and seizure. The
court rejected this argument and permitted the seizure because given the time necessary to
obtain a search warrant, the percentage of alcohol in the blood would have diminished thus
destroying the evidence.
3. 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Chimel).
4. Id. at 765.

5. Id. at 766, n. 12.
6. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) held that the search of a desk, safe,
and file cabinet in a one-room office, lasting about 1 hours was reasonable as incident to a
valid arrest, where the office was small and under the "immediate" and complete control of
the arrestee.
7. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). Pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, the
defendant was arrested in his living room for federal crimes involving mail fraud and forgery.
Defendant was handcuffed, and a search of the entire apartment was undertaken. The
purpose of the search was to find two cancelled checks. The searched lasted five hours and
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arrest. Harris and Rabinowitz had their beginnings as dictum in a
1914 case, Weeks v. United States.8 Even in Weeks, however, the
court limited the search to the person and not the place. Eleven years
later, in Carroll v. United States,9 the court expanded the Weeks
dictum to extend the search of a person to whatever was in his
"control."
When a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found
upon his person or in his control which is unlawful for him to have
and which may be used to prove
the offense may be seized and held
0
as evidence in the prosecution.'
In overruling Harris and Rabinowitz the court was merely redefining
and narrowing the concept of "control." Harris and Rabinowitz had
expanded the area of permissible search by basing the standard on a
property concept of "control." For example, the idea of control
included areas that were not necessarily under the defendant's
physical or actual control, but were deemed to be in his "constructive possession." Using this criteria, assuming a defendant had a key
to his residence, he was said to be in "control" of it, and a general
search of the entire house could be made.' ' In addition, the
Rabinowitz court attached independent significance to the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment. The warrant requirement
of the second clause was not viewed as critical or mandatory, but was
construed as merely a suggestion of one possible means of assuring
that a search be reasonable.' 2 The Fourth Amendment was thus
interpreted as prohibiting unreasonable searches in the abstract. The
major flaw in Harrisand Rabinowitz is the vagueness of "reasonable"
and "control." In following these cases courts were forced to make
inside a desk drawer they found a sealed envelope marked "personal papers." The envelope
was found to contain altered Selective Service documents, and those documents were used
to secure Harris' conviction for violating the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. The
warrantless search was held valid as incident to an arrest.
8. 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914), quoted in Chimel at 755.
9. 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (hereinafter cited as Carroll).
10. Chimel at 755, quoting Carroll at 158.
11. United States v. Beigel, 254 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd 370 F.2d 751 (2d
Cir. 1967). See also, State v. Sedillo, 79 N.M. 289, 442, P.2d 601 (1968).
12. Landynski, supra note 2, at 42. "The amendment divides naturally into two parts,
the first containing a general guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches, the second
specifying the conditions under which a warrant authorizing a search may be issued.
Nowhere in the amendment is the term "unreasonable' defined as the relationship of the
two parts clarified. Three possible interpretations emerge: (1) That the reasonable search is
one that meets the warrant requirements specified in the second clause; (2) That the first
clause provides an additional restriction by implying that some searches may be
unreasonble, and therefore not permissible, even when made under a warrant; or (3) That
the first clause provides an additional search power, authorizing the judiciary to find some
searches reasonable even when carried out without a warrant." See also Note, Search and
Seizure Since Chimel v. California, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 1011 (1970).
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an after-the-fact determination of the reasonableness of a specific
search without adequate guidelines. Chimel provides a more objective
test for defining "reasonable," and thus responds to Justice Frankfurther's dissent in Rabinowitz, where he stated, "To say that the
search must be reasonable is to require some criterion of reason.
...It is no criterion of reason to say that the district court must find
it reasonable.' a Thus Chimel is helpful to law enforcement officers
as it provides specific guidelines for conducting proper searches and
lessens the risk that evidence so found will be excluded.
NEW GUIDELINES
Chimel introduces two new guidelines. It qualifies control with the
word "immediate," and makes a warrantless search outside the area
of a suspect's immediate control per se unreasonable. In so doing,
Chimel returns to the original purposes of a search incident to an
arrest which are prevention of the destruction of evidence, officer
protection, and prevention of the suspect's escape.1 4 In effect,
Chimel revives the idea that the purpose of the search ought to be
the guide in determining its scope. Chimel attempts to do away with
the abuses that were sanctioned by Harris and Rabinowitz. For
example, since the standard of probable cause to make a warrantless
arrest is somewhat less in practice than the probable cause necessary
to conduct a warrantless search, arrests were utilized when the officers did not have sufficient probable cause to conduct a search.' "
Searches incident to arrest were often conducted where an arrest
would not ordinarily have been made were it not for the desire to
search. Officers often timed the arrest to coincide with the defendant's presence at home or in some other area they desired to search.
Thus they could search the entire area since he was deemed to
"constructively control" it.' 6 Another common abuse was the arrest
13. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Rabinowitz, supra note 6, at 83.
14. Abel v. United States 362 U.S. 217 at 236 (1960) and Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 283 (1914). In Weeks the Supreme Court recognized the common law right of search
without a warrant as incident to arrest.
15. Although both a warrantless arrest and a warrantless search technically require the
existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances, the exigent circumstances are so
often presumed in the arrest situation that the officers often need only to prove the
existence of probable cause. In the warrantless search situation, however, both requirements
must be met and the existence of exigent circumstances is not presumed, but rather, must
be asserted or the search will be per se unreasonable. Thus in practice, higher standards must
be met for a warrantless search than an arrest. See also Chevigny, Police Abuses in
Connection with the Law of Search and Seizure, 5 Crin. L. Bull. 323 (1969), and
Comment, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1182
(1958).
16. McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950) and Niro v. United States,
388 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1968).
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for a minor offense, such as a traffic violation, which was carried out
as a pretext because the officer suspected the person of a more
serious offense and wanted to search for possible evidence.' " These
abuses were effectuated because officers were under the impression
that once probable cause for an arrest was established, they could
dispense with other requirements normally necessary for a search.
Chimel attempts to correct this misimpression by separating the
arrest and the subsequent search into two independent acts, each
with its own constitutional safeguards. Chimel governs the second
act, i.e., the search; even if the officers have independently established probable cause to search after the arrest, they are still required
to obtain a search warrant.
Once the incident search is viewed as separate from the arrest, one
must examine its various stages, and not just its initial validity, to
determine if it has been properly conducted. Beginning a search
properly does not allow officers to proceed as they please.
The first part of a search may generally be called the "initial
intrusion" which is considered proper if it falls into any of the following categories: pursuant to a valid warrant; incident to arrest; hot
pursuit; vehicular search; stop and frisk, etc; etc. The initial intrusion
most commonly occurs after an officer has shown probable cause
and obtained a warrant. Other types of initial intrusions require
exigent circumstances which render it impractical to obtain a warrant. The second part of a search can be called the exploratory stage
which determines the scope of the search. This stage is governed by
the particularity requirement of the warrant, the distinct objective of
which is, "that those searches deemed necessary should be as limited
as possible. Here the specific evil is the general warrant. The problem
is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belonging."' ' It is to this stage of the search
that Chimel is addressed. Although one's first impression may be that
Chimel concerns only searches incident to arrest, Chimel limitations
have also been applied to searches in which the initial intrusion has
fallen into another category, such as entry with a search warrant or
in hot pursuit. Given this broad application of Chimel, it is not
surprising that its interpretation in subsequent cases has often been
inconsistent and confusing.' I Although Chimel attempts to set
17. Amador-Gonzales v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); Handley v. State,
430 P.2d 830 (1967). See also Minn. L. Rev. supra, note 12, at 1014.
18. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (hereinafter cited as
Coolidge).
19. In State v. Paul, 80 N.M. 521, 458 P.2d 594 (1969) the court applied Chimel and
excluded the fruits of a search in which the police had a warrant for x, but during that
search saw y and seized it. The court held that Chimel was a reaffirmation of Marron v.
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stringent guidelines for the proper scope of a search, state courts,
lower Federal courts, and the Supreme Court, in subsequent decisions, have been plagued by questions left open by Chimel. Since
police practices are affected to a great extent by lower court interpretations of the new standards, it will be helpful to look into the
interpretation given Chimel in subsequent decisions.
THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

An area that remains unclear in spite of Chimel is the status of the
Plain View Doctrine, the supplement or concomitant of any search.
This doctrine allows officers to seize any incriminating evidence
without a warrant if it is within plain view. It is reasoned that if an
officer has made a proper initial intrusion, and is thus legally in a
place which affords him plain view of the evidence, then technically
it is not a "search" as he did not have to "look for it." 20 The
following language in Chimel seems to have left the doctrine intact:
There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely
searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs-or, for
that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other
closed or concealed area in that room itself.2 1

Since plain sight does not mean concealed, Chimel impliedly permits
the seizure of something in plain view in the room where the arrest
occurs, or at least in close
proximity, even though it may be beyond
2
the defendant's control. 2
The problem with the Plain View Doctrine is that its limits have
never been specifically defined. It has great potential for abuse as it
can easily be used as a vehicle to conduct a general exploratory
search. 2 3 If one extends this doctrine, any evidence discovered by
the police can be considered to be in plain view at the moment of
seizure. 2 4 ".

.

. To permit warrantless plain view searches without

United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). Marron had formally been modified by Harris and
Rabinowitz, supra at notes 6 and 7, which allowed officers to search pursuant to a warrant
and seize items not described in the warrants, indirectly it reaffirms the importance of the
particularity requirement of a warrant and the fact that nothing should be left to the
discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
20. The Plain Sight Doctrine allows the seizure of the objects in the plain sight of the
officer if he has a right to be in a position to see them. Thy doctrine does not apply where
the officer's presence is illegal. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 236 (1968); Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 at 42 (1963); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); United
States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1957).
21. Chimel at 763.
22. Coolidge, at 465-6, n. 24.
23. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
24. Coolidge at 465.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

limit would be to undo much of what was decided in Chimel."25
The question remains, what are the limits imposed by Chimel?
When the object in plain view is in the room where the arrest is
made the item can be properly seized.' 6 In State v.Sero,2 the
court not only condoned seizure of items within the same room, but
also of items in an adjoining room seen from the first room through a
window in a partition. If one followed this holding to its logical
conclusion, it would mean that after the initial viewing from the first
room, the officers could properly enter the second room to seize
evidence, and from there glance into a third room, and so on. This
would defeat the intended limits of Chimel. With this in mind, it can
be argued that Chimel should be applied literally and the officer's
glimpse be limited to the room of the arrest, and not be extended to
include items seen from that room.
More ambiguity arises when the officers enter a room in the house
other than the one in which the arrest takes place. This could happen
in a variety of circumstances. For example, the officers may have to
walk through several rooms before reaching the defendant. 2 In
Warden v. Hayden2 9 the court admitted evidence found in the
course of the search for the suspect. As in Chimel, the court in
Warden looked to the purpose of the search to define the permissible
scope. Since the search was to find the suspect and his weapons, the
court limited the places that could be searched to those large enough
to contain or conceal the suspect or his weapons. The court was
careful to point out that the broad search was permissible only prior
to, or immediately contemporaneous with, Hayden's arrest."
25. Id. at 482.
26. United States v. Badilla, 434 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1970), State v. Miller, 80 N.M. 227,
453 P.2d 590 (1969), State v. Rhodes, 80 N.M. 729, 460 P.2d 259 (1969). In this case
thirty-one marijuana cigarettes were held to be inadmissible under Chimel becase they were
not within the defendant's immediate control. The cigarettes were found after the officers
observed a dark spot in the bowl of a light fixture. Although the state did not try to argue
the Plain View exception, one can imply that in order to come under that exception, the
officer must be able to identify what he is seeing for it to be in plain view.
See also United States v. Avey, 428 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1970), and State v. Anaya, 82
N.M. 531, 484 P.2d 373 (1971). Both of these cases involved the seizure of incriminating
evidence in Plain View within the vehicle in which the defendants were arrested. Somehow
the courts have analogized this to the seizure of evidence in the same room in which an
arrest takes place. Some weight seems to be given to the proximity of the arrestee to the
evidence seized, which gives rise to the question: Can the arrestee circumvent the Plain View
exception to the warrant requirement by getting out of and far enough away from his car
before the officer gets close enough to look inside?
27. 82 N.M. 17, 474 P.2d 503 (1971).
28. People v. Mann, 305 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1969). In this case officers were permitted an
overall glance of the defendant's apartment because they followed him around while he was
dressing and saw stolen items which were in plain sight.
29. 287 U.S. 294 (1967). See also supra note 2.
30. Id. at 299.

July 19)

CHIMEL v. CALIFORNIA

Assumedly, as soon as the arrest is effectuated, the narrow limitations of Chimel would come into play and the officers could then
search no farther than the area within the arrestee's immediate control. Once again it must be stressed that the validity of the search
does not depend only on the character of the initial intrusion. In
Warden, the initial intrusion was proper because the officers were in
hot pursuit. However, the moment a suspect is apprehended, the
scope of the permissible search may change.31
Officers may also enter rooms other than where the arrest occurs to
search for other dangerous persons. It could be argued that anything
in plain view could be seized. Chimel, however, does not make it
clear whether such a practice is permissible. If "immediate control"
is given a literal interpretation, officers could not go into other
rooms, since the defendant would not have control of any other area
other than the room in which he is detained. On the other hand, if
one considers the underlying purposes of Chimel, protection of
police officers and prevention of destruction of evidence, it would
seem that under certain circumstances officers would be allowed a
cursory glance into other rooms to prevent a possible accomplice
from harming them or destroying evidence. In Giimel, for example,
if the police had returned for a search warrant, the defendant's wife
would have had an opportunity to dispose of the coins. Indeed
Justice White in his dissent in Chimel, saw this problem as one of the
chief shortcomings of the decision:
assuming that there is probable cause to search premises at the
spot where a suspect is arrested, it seems to me unreasonable to
require the police to leave the scene in order to obtain a search
warrant when they are already legally there to make a valid arrest,
and when there must almost always be a strong possibility that
confederates of the arrested man will in the meanwhile remove items
for which the police have probable cause to search.3 2
The possibility that a dangerous accomplice may be hiding in another
31. In United States v. Miller, 449 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1971) the court made the mistake
of characterizing a search only in terms of the initial intrusion. Here the police were in hot
pursuit of the defendant and finally found him in the waiting room of a dentist's office.
Although the defendant was in view from the moment the door was opened and they
arrested him immediately, the court upheld the subjsequent warrantless search of the other
rooms and admitted a stolen bottle of whiskey which was in plain view in the dentist's
laboratory. The court based its decision on Warden v. Hayden, supra, but failed to note that
Warden required the search to be prior to or contemporaneous with the arrest, which it was
not in this case. The court in Miller expressly said that Chimel did not apply as it was a
search in hot pursuit. It would seem however, that as soon as the suspect was arrested and
apprehended that the search would no longer be one in hot pursuit, but one incident to
arrest and thus Chimel would apply.
32. Chimel at 774.
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room presents another set of exigent circumstances that may justify
a warrantless search. The problem, however, is that the police can
always "suspect" a third person to be present and thus always be
justified in a general exploratory search. This will again present
courts with concomitant plain view problems and could undo much
of In
what
Chimel sought to do. 3 3
a recent
lengthy and multifaceted decision, the Supreme Court
tried to clarify some of the confusion surrounding Chimel and the
Plain View Doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire3 4 involved the
warrantless search and seizure of an automobile parked in the driveway of the house where the defendant was arrested. The state argued
several theories to support the admission of evidence found in the
car, one of which was that the car was an "instrumentality" of the
crime, and as such could be seized on Coolidge's property because it
was in plain view. The court rejected this argument and held, inter
alia, that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence
in plain view, but not for that reason alone and only when the
discovery is "inadvertent." 3 The Court reasoned that if the officers
had prior knowledge of what might be in plain view, then they would
also have had ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant.3 6 The
court expressly related Chimel to the plain view doctrine as follows:
The plain view exception to the warrant requirement is not in conflict with the law of search incident to a valid arrest expressed in
Chimel.... Where... the arresting officer inadvertently not concealed, although outside the area under the immediate control of the
arrestee, the officer may seize it, so long as the plain view was
obtained in the course of an appropriately limited search of the
arrestee. 37
By adding the requirement of "inadvertence" to the Plain View
Doctrine, the court sought to abolish "planned warrantless
33. In addition to the hiding accomplice dilemma, there is also the question of what to
do with any other persons who may be in the same room where the arrest takes place, but
who are not arrested themselves. The court in United States v. Manarite, 314 F.Supp. 607
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), attempted to solve this problem by creating a legal fiction to accomodate
the Chimel standards. In Manarite the defendant was in custody of an agent, but was not
physically restrained. There were two other men in the room. They were also unrestrained
and within their reach were two tables that were searched and yielded incriminating
evidence. Since weapons had already been found in the room, the officers went ahead and
searched not only the area within the defendant's immediate control, but also that of the
two accomplices. The court held that these two accomplices were in effect extensions of the
defendant's physical presence, constructively placing the defendant within reach of the two
men and thus the two tables. By creating this fiction of "constructive reach" the court
seems to have been reverting to the broader Harris-Rabinowitz standard of constructive
possession.
34. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
35. Id. at 469.

36. Id. at 470.
37. Id. at n. 24, p. 465.
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seizures." 3 But the requirement presents many difficulties, and as
Justice White observed the "inadvertence" rule actually limits
Chinmel. Before Coolidge, it was clear that while making searches
incident to arrest, the police could seize anything in plain view in the
same room, or if a view of it was obtained in the course of an
appropriately limited search of the arrestee. After Coolidge, the
evidence seen in this situation could not be seized unless the view
was "inadvertently" obtained.3 9
Another difficulty involves the interpretation of "inadvertent."
Justice Black, in his dissent in Coolidge remarked:
Only rarely can it be said that evidence seized incident to an arrest is
truly unexpected or inadvertent. Indeed, if the police officer had no
expectation of discovering weapons, contraband, or other evidence,
he would make no search. 4 0
It is not clear whether "inadvertence" means that the officer had no
expectation of finding anything at all or no expectation of finding
something specific.
The main problem with the "inadvertence" requirement of
Coolidge is that it is a subjective test that requires a court to decide
the state of mind of the officer prior to a warrantless seizure. While
Chimel sought to change an after-the-fact court decision as to the
reasonableness of a search, the Coolidge inadvertence test reinstates
this approach. In effect, Coolidge does not answer any of the questions left open by Chimel regarding the Plain View Doctrine. If anything, it creates more confusion.
To see how little Coolidge aids lower courts in their interpretation
4
of Chimel, one need only look at United States v. Welsch. 1 In that
case, two agents, one posing as a prospective purchaser of drugs and
the other as his chemist, observed the defendant removing a suitcase
containing drugs from under a bed in a motel room where the purchase was to take place. The agent-chemist subsequently left the
motel room to analyze the drugs. During his absence, the defendant
replaced the suitcase under the bed. The agent returned to the motel
within twenty minutes, arrested the defendant, and seized the suitcase. The court held the suitcase and its contents admissible under
the Plain View Doctrine because the officers had seen its contents
twenty minutes before, and it was "constructively" in plain view.4 2
Whatever that may mean is uncertain. Considering how easily use of
the Plain View Doctrine can circumvent the Chimel guidelines and
38. Id. at 471.
39. Id. at 519.
40. Id at 508-9, n. 5.
41. 446 F.2d 220 (1Oth Cir. 1971).
42. Id. at 223.
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allow a general exploratory search, one can only shudder at the
possibility of what a Constructive Plain View Doctrine would do to
Fourth Amendment protections. The Welsch court mentions that it
based its decision to admit the evidence on Coolidge and Chimel, but
it is clear that it followed them incorrectly. Had Chimel and Coolidge
been properly applied, the warrantless seizure would have been invalid. The suitcase was out of the defendant's immediate control. It
was also hidden under the bed and therefore not in plain view. As for
the inadvertence requirement of Coolidge, the Welsch court mentions
it, but then somehow equates it with the impracticality of obtaining
a warrant within twenty minutes. Obviously, if the officers went to
the motel in the guise of prospective purchasers, they must have had
some expectation of finding drugs. It is difficult to see how the court
could have called their actions "inadvertent" and thus admit evidence under the Coolidge requirements for Plain View. This case is a
good example of the confusion generated by Coolidge.
VEHICULAR SEARCHES
Another unanswered question is Chimel's effect on vehicular
searches. Chimel did not deal with the question specifically, but it
was alluded to in the following note:
Our holding today is of course entirely consistent with the recognized principle that, assuming the existence of probable cause,
automobile and other vehicles may be searched without warrants
"where it is not practical to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought." 4 3
One's first impression may be that all vehicular searches are
exempt from the Chimel guidelines because of Carroll v. United
States, supra.4 4 "However, the word 'automobile' is not a talisman
in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.'""
To say that an automobile is inherently different from a
fixed structure, such as a house, because it is moveable is a simplistic
distinction. At best, one could say that they have the possibility of
being different, but not that they always are. The circumstances of
each case involving a vehicular search must be examined. A vehicle
should only be deemed mobile when there is a possibility it may be
moved. If no such possibility exists, then it should take on the character of a house and the Chimel standards should apply. Chimel
43. Chimel at 764, n. 9, quoting Caxroll.
44. See also supra note 2.
45. Coolidge at 461.
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seems to support this approach to vehicular searches since the court
based its decision on Preston v. United States. 4 6 In Preston the
defendants were arrested for vagrancy while sitting in their car. Their
automobile was not searched at the time or place of arrest. Without
obtaining a warrant, the police took it to a garage where it was
thoroughly searched. The court held this search illegal and stated:
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which might
be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the
need to prevent the destruction of evidence

. . .

but these justifica-

tions are
absent where a search is remote in time or place from the
4
arrest. 7

As in Chimel, the court in Preston adhered to the idea that the
scope of a warrantless search ought to be limited by its purposes. The
usual purposes of search incident to arrest are protection of the
officer and prevention of destruction of evidence. These purposes
cease to exist when the search is too remote from the arrest. Thus
under both Preston and Chimel, if an automobile is taken into
custody, or if the defendant is unable to drive it away because he is
under arrest, the police cannot search further than the area within his
immediate control and would have to obtain a search warrant to
search the entire vehicle.
The application of Preston-Chimelguidelines on vehicular searches
may have become somewhat limited since the Supreme Court ruling
in Chambers v. Maroney.4 8 Here the defendant was driving his automobile when the police stopped him and arrested him for robbery.
His car was not searched at that time but was taken to the police
station and thoroughly searched. The officers had not obtained a
warrant. The court held the fruits of that search to be admissible and
based its decision on Carroll,supra, which states that an officer can
search a vehicle incident to arrest when he has probable cause and if
the car is in danger of being moved. The court reasoned that since
the officers could have searched the defendant immediately after the
arrest under the Carroll criteria, it made no difference if they moved
the car to the police station and searched it there.
Unlike the Chimel-Preston decisions, the court did not place
emphasis on the actual mobility of the vehicle or the remoteness of
the search from the arrest. Instead, the Chambers court distinguished
Preston on the grounds that no probable cause to search existed,
46. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
47. Id. at 367.
48. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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while it did in Chambers. 9 Chambers quoted the Carroll court
which, "noted that the search of an auto on probable cause proceeds
on a theory wholly different from that justifying the search incident
to an arrest." 5 0 Thus the Chimel warrant requirement to search the
entire automobile does not apply. As it stands, Chimel-Preston requirements are applicable only to those vehicular searches incident to
arrest where there is no probable cause to search, and if probable
cause to search does exist, then Chambers applies.
For example, in the New Mexico case of State v. Courtright5' the
court based its decision on Chambers and admitted evidence taken
during a warrantless search of the defendant's car. The defendant was
arrested for robbery at a filling station where his car was stopped,
having just been involved in a collision with another car parked there.
After the arrest, the automobile was removed to the police station
and was searched two hours later. The court justified the search as
follows:
The evidence is sufficient to show that the police officers had
reasonable or probable cause to search the automobile at the place
of arrest, and therefore
this right continued to a search at the police
5
station shortly after. 2
Prior to the ruling in Chambers, the court may have looked to
Chimel-Preston to decide the case.' 3 This would have made the evidence inadmissible regardless of the existence of probable cause as
the auto was immobile and the subsequent search at the garage too
remote from the arrest. Chambers, however, has exempted Chimel
from the vehicular search area where there is probable cause and
therefore limited its application considerably.
CONCLUSION
Prior to Chimel, Fourth Amendment law regarding search and
seizure was at best a group of seemingly subjective decisions based on
an amorphous standard of reasonableness. Using this very pliable
criteria, the court was able in each decision to completely change its
49. Id. at 47.
50. Id. at 49.
51. 10 N.M. Bar Bulletin 481 (Jan. 27, 1972).
52. Id. at 482.
53. If the Supreme Court had not ruled as it did in Chambers v. Maroney, supra, Chimel
may have rendered the evidence seized in Courtright inadmissible. This is based on the court
opinion in State v. Reyes, 81 N.M. 404, 467 P.2d 730 (1970) which involved a similar
vehicular search. In that case the court held the evidence admissible, but stated that the
search occurred before Chimel and that since Chime! was not applied retroactively that the
search was reasonable. The court stated that had this been a post-Chimel case, the evidence
would definitely have been inadmissible. Reyes at 405-6.
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position on the importance of search warrants. Indeed, the history of
the cases in this area as outlined in Chime/ takes on a pendulum-like
pattern which is illustrative of the Supreme Court's indecision in the
area. Chimel seemed to be the end of such indecision and
inconsistency; it was objective, specific, and definitive in its strong
insistence that reasonableness should only be predicated on the
existence of a warrant. But alas, is the pendulum to swing again? The
ruling in Chambers was certainly a swing in the direction of easily
dispensing with the warrant requirement. The ruling in Coolidge was
intended to clarify Chime/, but actually made it confusing and
difficult to apply. Perhaps the court is wavering in the strong
position it expressed in Chimel. The majority opinion in Coolidge
admits:
Of course, it would be nonsense to pretend that our decision today
reduces Fourth Amendment law to complete order and harmony.
The decisions of the court over the years point in differing directions
and differ in emphasis. No trick of logic will make them all perfectly
consistent. 5 4
While the Chimel court led one to believe that the Fourth
Amendment requires officers to obtain warrants whenever possible,
the Coolidge court leaves the requirement uncertain.
I perceive in these inconsistent cases the essential tension that
springs from the uncertain mandate which this provision of the
Constitution gives to this court.55
Any prediction about the fact of Chimel would only be speculation,
but one can hope that it will not be sacrificed to maintain that
"essential tension."
PATRICIA MADRID

54. Coolidge at 483.
55. Id. at 484 quoting J. Harlan in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 449-50 (1970).

